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Note
When Volunteers Become Employees:
Using a Threshold-Remuneration Test Informed
by the Fair Labor Standards Act To Distinguish
Employees from Volunteers
Emily Bodtke*
Shortly after Rachel Juino started volunteering as a firefighter with the Livingston Parish Fire District 5, a fellow fire1
fighter, John Sullivan, began to sexually harass her. Juino reported the incidents to the captain and fire chief, but neither
took action to discipline Sullivan or prevent future harass2
ment. After Sullivan ripped off Juino’s face mask during a dis3
pute at a fire scene, Juino ended her services with District 5.
Juino filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and six months later she sued District 5 for sexual
4
harassment and retaliation under Title VII. On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit ruled that because Juino failed to show that she
received significant remuneration for her services, she could
5
not claim she was an employee. As a result, the court halted its
* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A.,
Hillsdale College, 2012. Thank you to Professor Stephen Befort for his
thoughtful feedback on this Note. Thank you to Laura Gordon, Kaitlyn Dennis, Samuel Andre, Jonathan Grant, and Joseph Serge for carrying this Note
to publication with their careful edits. Thank you to the many teachers, professors, and mentors who critiqued and strengthened my writing over the
years. Thank you to my family, especially my parents Larry and Liana Bodtke,
for teaching me the value of hard work, giving me opportunities to learn, and
inspiring me to pursue a career in law. Thank you to Ugo Ubbaonu for unceasing encouragement throughout the stresses of law school. Copyright © 2015 by
Emily Bodtke.
1. Original Brief of Appellant, Rachel Juino at 4, Juino v. Livingston
Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 3:11-CV-466).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.
2013).
5. Id. at 439–40.
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analysis without any consideration of the traditional common
6
law factors that show employment. The court concluded that
Juino was a volunteer rather than an employee, and thus did
7
not fall under the protection of Title VII.
Juino’s story is not unique. Many volunteers and other voluntarily unpaid workers like student interns have brought lawsuits alleging discrimination in their workplaces, only to learn
statutory protections do not apply to them because they lack
8
employee status. Determining who is or is not an employee is
critical because the existence of an employment relationship
triggers multiple statutory obligations and legal doctrines, including minimum wage requirements, collective bargaining
9
laws, anti-discrimination rules, workers’ compensation cover10
age, taxes and tax withholding, vicarious tort liability, and,
starting in 2015 for large businesses, health insurance cover11
age.
Despite the fundamental and far-reaching importance of
the “employee” determination, the proper judicial test to decide
12
employee status in a volunteer context remains unsettled. The
majority of circuits apply a threshold-remuneration test, which
requires the disputed volunteer/employee to show substantial
compensation before the court will examine the common law
13
agency factors. Under this test, substantial compensation may
consist of direct cash payments or significant indirect benefits
14
not merely incidental to the volunteer activity. The Sixth and
Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, consider remuneration only
one of several non-dispositive factors in determining an em6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 170 F.3d 974
(10th Cir. 1998); Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236 (11th
Cir. 1998); O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997); Neff v. Civil Air Patrol, 916 F. Supp. 710 (S.D. Ohio 1996); Lowery v. Klemm, 446 Mass. 572
(2006).
9. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee
When It Sees One and How It Ought To Stop Trying, 22 BERKLEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 295, 301 (2001).
10. See RICHARD A. BALES ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 8
(2007).
11. See Dan Mangan, Delayed: Obamacare’s Employer Mandate for Small
Businesses, CNBC (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101393331.
12. Juino, 717 F.3d at 435.
13. Id. (“The Second, Fourth, [Fifth,] Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the threshold-remuneration test.”).
14. Id.

BODTKE_4fmt

1/6/2015 3:00 PM

2015] WHEN VOLUNTEERS BECOME EMPLOYEES

1115

15

ployment relationship. This circuit split exacerbates the already existing difficulty in determining whether an individual
16
is an employee. The split also demonstrates a growing nonuniformity in employment law that challenges employers’ and
17
employees’ ability to understand their rights and obligations.
Although the majority threshold-remuneration test identifies
compensation as the key distinction between employees and
volunteers, it suffers from inconsistency in application and in18
congruity with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Lack of
a precise definition of “remuneration” results in differing applications of the test that further complicate the employment law
19
landscape, while the lack of continuity with the FLSA creates
situations where an individual might be an employee under one
20
federal statute but not another.
This Note addresses which test should be applied to volunteers and other unpaid workers claiming employee status and
how that test should be defined. This Note does not consider
the arguments for or against legislative change to cover volunteers and unpaid interns under various federal employment
21
statutes, but rather focuses on how federal courts should respond to the current legal landscape. The judicial approach to
the distinction between employees and volunteers is important
because, while our economy increasingly depends upon volun-

15. Id. at 435, 438.
16. See James O. Castagnera et al., Are Volunteers Employees?, 27 NO. 10
TERMINATION EMP. BULL. 1 (Oct. 2011) (“In an economy where the lines between traditional employer-employee relationships and volunteers are blurring in many contexts, settling the issue will take on increasing importance.”).
17. See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and QuasiEmployers, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 609 (2012).
18. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012).
19. See Karen Gwinn Clay, Volunteers and Title VII: How Far Do Employment Laws Extend?, 20 NO. 5 MISS. EMP. L. LETTER 3 (Aug. 2013) (discussing the uncertainty of what constitutes threshold remuneration in practice).
20. See U.S. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, THE
DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS FINAL REPORT 64 (1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION]; Rubinstein, supra note 17, at 628 n.121 (describing cases where individuals qualify as employees under one statute but not another).
21. See
generally
Tara
Kpere-Daibo,
Employment
Law—
Antidiscrimination—Unpaid and Unprotected: Protecting Our Nation’s Volunteers Through Title VII, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 135 (2009) (arguing
that Title VII should be amended to cover unpaid workers); David C. Yamada,
The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L. REV. 215 (2002)
(recommending legislative change to include unpaid interns under antidiscrimination statutes, regardless of whether they are paid).
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22

teers and unpaid interns, the circuit split over which test to
23
apply to such volunteers is widening (most recently in Juino).
Circuits that have not yet approached the volunteer-employee
24
question will likely have to choose a side in the near future.
This Note presents the first thorough defense and critique of
the threshold-remuneration test, explaining both its merits and
25
deficiencies, and offers the novel solution to adopt a modified
threshold-remuneration test informed by the FLSA. I propose
that courts rely upon standards developed under the FLSA by
case law and the Department of Labor in determining what
constitutes significant remuneration to create an employment
relationship under Title VII and other federal antidiscrimination laws. Integrating the FLSA distinctions between
employees and volunteers into the threshold-remuneration test
will enable courts to determine employee status in volunteer
contexts more consistently and efficiently without leading to
divergent results among various employment statutes.
Part I introduces the legal standards developed to determine employment status, with particular emphasis on volunteers. Part II analyzes the merits and downfalls of the threshold-remuneration test as a means of identifying volunteers who
should be considered employees. Part III proposes that courts
uniformly adopt the threshold-remuneration test for volunteer
contexts, but modify the inquiry to increase consistency in application and ensure continuity with the FLSA. This Note ar22. See infra Part I.B.
23. Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir.
2013).
24. See id. at 435 (implying that the First, Third, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have not explicitly addressed how to determine when a volunteer is an
employee). For example, district courts in the Seventh Circuit have reached
opposing conclusions on which test to apply to volunteers claiming employee
status. Compare Jones-Walsh v. Town of Cicero, No. 04 C 6029, 2005 WL
2293671, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2005) (finding that workers who do not receive any form of compensation are not employees under Title VII), with
Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, No. 11 C 04920, 2012 WL 6021553, at *8–10
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2012) (finding remuneration one of several common law factors courts must consider when determining whether volunteer ambulance
squad members were employees).
25. Cf. Christopher R. Morgan, Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Department and the Changing Understanding of Volunteer As Employee, 17
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1223 (2013) (arguing that remuneration should be one
of several non-dispositive factors); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Our Nation’s Forgotten Workers: The Unprotected Volunteers, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. 147, 179
(2006) (proposing the uniform adoption of the threshold-remuneration test in
volunteer contexts on the basis of its practicality and use by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)).
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gues that the threshold-remuneration test offers the best method to determine employment status for voluntarily unpaid
workers because it recognizes the centrality of compensation to
the employment relationship. Despite this benefit, this Note
recommends courts more precisely define remuneration to
avoid creating yet another unpredictable test in the multifarious arena of employment law and to conform to the FLSA regulatory framework.
I. DETERMINING EMPLOYMENT STATUS IN THE
VOLUNTEER CONTEXT
This Part describes the current legal framework for determining whether an individual is an employee under various
federal employment statutes. Section A presents the major
statutory definitions of “employee” and explains the various judicial tests developed to address the statutory definitions’ ambiguity. Section B discusses the role of volunteers and unpaid
interns in modern American society. Section C explores the various judicial approaches to voluntarily unpaid workers claiming
employee status.
A. LEGAL DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE
Questions surrounding who is and who is not an employee
26
have long perplexed the employment law arena. This confusion derives largely from employment statutes’ failures to de27
fine “employee” in a clear and useful way. The National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), for example, states that “the term ‘em28
ployee’ shall include any employee,” while the FLSA defines
29
an employee as “any individual employed by an employer.”
30
Such “non-definitions” provide little guidance, essentially forc31
ing courts to apply a judicially created definition.
26. See Carlson, supra note 9, at 298; Rubinstein, supra note 17, at 608.
27. BALES ET AL., supra note 10, at 7–8; Carlson, supra note 9, at 298; Rubinstein, supra note 17, at 608.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
29. Id. § 203(e)(1). Many other federal employment statutes adopt identical language. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630(f)
(2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2012);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012); Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2012); see also Rubinstein, supra note
25, at 159.
30. Carlson, supra note 9, at 298.
31. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992).
Finding that ERISA’s definition of “employee” “is completely circular and ex-
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In response to this statutory vacuum, courts have devel32
oped their own standards to determine employment status. At
least four well-established tests exist to distinguish between
employees and non-employees: the common law agency test,
the primary purpose test, the economic realities test, and a hy33
brid of the common law and economic realities tests.
The Supreme Court indicated in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden that the common law test is the appropriate standard to apply where the statute at issue fails to ar34
ticulate a specific definition. The common law agency test
focuses on the employer’s degree of control over the putative
35
employee, analyzing a non-exhaustive list of anywhere from
eleven to twenty un-weighted, non-dispositive factors to deter36
mine whether such control is present. The primary purpose
test interprets “employee” based upon the context and objective
37
of the statute in which it appears. The economic realities test,
which courts apply in cases interpreting the FLSA, the Family

plains nothing,” the Court decided to apply the common law agency test. Id. at
323.
32. Carlson, supra note 9, at 298 (“The real work of identifying ‘employees’ and their employment relationships has always been in the courts.”).
33. Rubinstein, supra note 17, at 617.
34. Darden, 503 U.S. at 322–23; Stouch v. Bros. of Order of Hermits of St.
Augustine, 836 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
35. Kpere-Daibo, supra note 21, at 143.
36. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 523–24 (listing twelve factors); Garrett v.
Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 982 (4th Cir. 1983) (listing eleven factors
relevant to the common law agency test); Rev. Rule 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296
(listing the twenty factors used by the Internal Revenue Service to determine
employment status); EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMP’T COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL § 2 (2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-III-A-1-c
(listing sixteen factors). The twelve common law factors listed by the Supreme
Court are:
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the
location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over
when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s
role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the
regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in
business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of
the hired party.
Darden, 503 U.S. at 523–24 (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989)).
37. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944) (“The word
[employee] . . . derives meaning from the context of that statute, which ‘must
be read in light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.’”
(quoting S. Chi. Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 259 (1940))).

BODTKE_4fmt

1/6/2015 3:00 PM

2015] WHEN VOLUNTEERS BECOME EMPLOYEES

1119

38

and Medical Leave Act, and the Social Security Act, analyzes
whether the putative employee is economically dependent upon
39
the business he or she serves. This test considers six nondispositive and un-weighted factors that affect economic de40
pendence. Finally, the hybrid test combines elements of the
41
common law agency test and the economic realities test. Cases
applying this test vary on whether the control or economic reli42
ance factors carry greater weight.
Courts and scholars acknowledge that this multiplicity of
judicial tests fails to resolve the ambiguities inherent in exist43
ing statutory definitions of “employee.” If anything, these
tests further complicate the issue. By “perpetuat[ing] an everexpanding catalogue of ‘factors,’” which are non-dispositive,
non-exhaustive, and un-weighted, courts have increased complexity and reduced predictability in determining whether
44
someone is an employee. Moreover, the sheer number of different tests and definitions can lead to inconsistent results de45
pending on which test is applied. Thus, both the indetermina38. BALES ET AL., supra note 10, at 13; Myra H. Barron, Who’s an Independent Contractor? Who’s an Employee?, 14 LAB. LAW. 457, 466–67 (1999).
39. Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 1994).
40. BALES ET AL., supra note 10, at 11. As articulated by one court, the six
factors are: the degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the work performed; the worker’s investment in facilities and equipment; the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit and loss; the degree of skill the performed service requires; the degree of permanence of the working relationship; and
whether the service is an integral part of the putative employer’s business.
Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg, Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1981)).
41. Rubinstein, supra note 17, at 627. Courts frequently apply this test in
Title VII cases. Id.
42. Id. at 627–28.
43. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944) (“Few
problems in the law have given greater variety of application and conflict in
results than the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly an
employer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent, entrepreneurial dealing.”); Richardson v. APAC-Mississippi, Inc., 631 So. 2d 143,
150 (Miss. 1994) (“[T]he various tests to determine the type of relationship are
themselves generalities which can be viewed quite differently, depending upon
which judge is applying them.”); Carlson, supra note 9, at 298–99 (“[T]he
courts have scarcely been any more clear or precise . . . in developing definitions or rules.”); Rubinstein, supra note 17, at 608 (“[T]here is no clear understanding about how the law should distinguish between employees and nonemployees.”); Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 160 (“From a public policy perspective, this lack of clarity is somewhat shocking.”).
44. Carlson, supra note 9, at 299 (noting that “the multi-factored ‘common
law’ test begs the question of employee status as much as answers it”).
45. DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 20, at 64 (explaining that “the line
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cy within each discrete test and the lack of uniformity across
46
the tests produces a confused regulatory system. Such uncer47
tainty fosters litigation, increases the likelihood of misclassi48
fying employees, and creates absurd results where an individ49
ual may be an employee under one statute but not another. In
short, the definition of “employee,” despite being fundamental
to employment law, remains one of the most uncertain concepts
in the field.
The “employee” analysis continues to extend to new situations, sometimes resulting in new tests. For example, in Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells, the Supreme Court
considered whether four physician-shareholders at a medical
clinic were employees under the Americans with Disabilities
50
Act (ADA). Although the Court concluded that the commonlaw element of control should be the “principal guidepost,” it
adopted a new six-factor test promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for the unique
problem of determining the employment status of major share51
holders. The Court’s approach shows that traditional tests developed in an independent contractor versus employee context
may not be binding in novel employment situations that involve
52
different relationship dynamics.
B. VOLUNTEERS IN THE UNITED STATES
In most cases analyzing the boundaries of the employment
relationship, courts distinguished employees from independent

has been drawn differently in the different statutes”); Rubinstein, supra note
17, at 617 (stating that the definition of employee is not uniform across federal
law).
46. DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 20, at 64 (describing the employment law system as a “regulatory morass”).
47. Rubinstein, supra note 17, at 609.
48. Employee misclassification can be intentional, reckless, or honestly
mistaken. Compare Carlson, supra note 9, at 336 (“[L]egal uncertainty encourages and rewards employer conduct that tests the limits of the law.”), with
Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 160 (noting that mistakenly misclassifying an
employee can lead to enormous and unexpected financial consequences for an
employer).
49. DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 20; see also Rubinstein, supra note
17, at 628 n.121 (describing cases where individuals qualify as employees under one statute but not another).
50. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 440
(2003).
51. Id. at 448–49.
52. Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 173.
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53

contractors. As Clackamas demonstrated, however, the “employee” question is extending to new situations where the factors developed to address the employee-independent contractor
54
distinction may be less relevant. One new situation courts in55
creasingly encounter is a volunteer claiming employee status.
The dictionary defines a volunteer as “a person who voluntarily offers himself or herself for a service or undertaking” or
56
“a person who performs a service willingly and without pay.”
Writing about the history of American volunteers, Susan Ellis
and Katherine Noyes argue that using lack of payment as the
57
sole defining factor of a volunteer is too narrow. Rather, Ellis
and Noyes contend that it is possible to receive money and still
be considered a volunteer, pointing out that Peace Corps members (typically considered volunteers) receive stipends to cover
living expenses and most volunteers receive reimbursements
58
for out-of-pocket expenses. Ellis and Noyes propose their own
definition of volunteering: “to choose to act in recognition of a
need, with an attitude of social responsibility and without con59
cern for monetary profit, going beyond one’s basic obligations.”
A somewhat similar but distinguishable definition arises in
the case of the unpaid student intern. The unpaid intern, like
the traditional volunteer, works voluntarily without pay or obligation, but not out of humanitarian, charitable, or social motivations. Rather, these volunteers work in exchange for valua60
ble job experience and potential career opportunities.
53. O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (1997).
54. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448–49; Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 173.
55. See, e.g., Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 432
(5th Cir. 2013); Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., 656 F.3d 348,
350–51 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Castagnera et al., supra note 16, at 2 (observing that the line between employee and volunteers is “blurring in many contexts”).
56. Volunteer, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.reference.com/
browse/volunteer (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
57. SUSAN J. ELLIS & KATHERINE H. NOYES, BY THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY
OF AMERICANS AS VOLUNTEERS 2 (rev. ed. 1990).
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id. at 4.
60. See Craig J. Ortner, Adapting Title VII to Modern Employment Realities: The Case for the Unpaid Intern, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2613, 2618 (1998);
Yamada, supra note 21, at 220. The distinction between traditional volunteers
and unpaid interns appears to lie primarily in their motivations and dependence on the volunteer opportunity. See O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 119
(2d Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that the student intern claiming harassment
“was dependent to some degree on successfully completing her internship”).
Other scholars, however, conclude that traditional volunteers donate their
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Employment law scholar Mitchell Rubinstein classifies
volunteers into two types: a “pure volunteer” or a “volunteer
61
plus.” A “pure volunteer” “receives nothing in return from the
62
organization he or she is serving,” while a “volunteer plus” receives reimbursement of expenses and other types of “minor
benefits such as death or disability insurance or even a small
63
stipend.”
The law also attempts to define volunteer in various places,
although not in any of the major federal employment statutes
64
themselves. The regulations for the FLSA contain a definition
of volunteer that restricts the concept to voluntary and uncom65
pensated service at public agencies. In practice, the Department of Labor also recognizes that volunteers who donate their
labor to nonprofit organizations out of “public service, religious,
66
or humanitarian objectives” are not employees. The Volunteer
Protection Act, which provides immunity from negligence law67
suits to a nonprofit organization’s volunteers, defines volunteer as someone who performs services for a nonprofit organization or governmental unit without compensation, or anything of
68
value in lieu of compensation, over $500 a year.
Although no single definition of volunteer garners complete
69
consensus, it is virtually undisputed that volunteers play a
70
critical role in American society. Approximately 62.6 million
services for multiple reasons, including “their own personal and social goals
and needs.” JON VAN TIL, MAPPING THE THIRD SECTOR: VOLUNTARISM IN A
CHANGING SOCIAL ECONOMY 26 (1988).
61. Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 153.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Leda E. Dunn, “Protection” of Volunteers Under Federal Employment Law: Discouraging Voluntarism?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 453 (1992).
65. 29 C.F.R. § 553.101 (2012) (“An individual who performs hours of service for a public agency for civic, charitable, or humanitarian reasons, without
promise, expectation or receipt of compensation for services rendered, is considered to be a volunteer during such hours.”).
66. Fair Labor Standards Act Advisor: Volunteers, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/scope/er16.asp (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
The Department of Labor specifies that individuals cannot volunteer services
to “for-profit private sector employers.” Id.
67. MELANIE L. HERMAN ET AL., NO SURPRISES: HARMONIZING RISK AND
REWARD IN VOLUNTEER MANAGEMENT 120 (4th ed. 2006).
68. Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 14505(6) (2012).
69. ELLIS & NOYES, supra note 57, at 2.
70. See Lauren Attard, A Price on Volunteerism: The Public Has a Higher
Duty To Accommodate Volunteers, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1089, 1089 (2007)
(“Volunteers are essential to the proper functioning of America.”); Dunn, supra
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people volunteered at least once between September 2012 and
September 2013 with a median of fifty hours of service per vol71
unteer. Volunteers serve in sectors ranging from religion, education, cultural arts, public safety, and politics to the less intui72
tive areas of labor, agriculture, business, and industry. These
voluntarily unpaid services grow increasingly important as
73
governments reduce their budgets and nonprofits seek to sup74
plement a small paid staff.
Unpaid internships also play a vital and growing role in
the American economy. Although no one keeps statistics on the
number of unpaid internships, there is widespread agreement
that the number has increased to approximately half a million
75
per year. Internships offer valuable job experience and future
employment opportunities to students, while providing cheap
labor and a convenient employee selection process for employ76
ers.
The prominence and importance of volunteerism in American society suggests that the employment status of volunteer
workers will critically affect the nonprofit community, the gov77
ernmental sector, and business industry.
C. WHEN DOES A VOLUNTEER BECOME AN EMPLOYEE?
Standards to determine volunteers’ employment status
have developed for primarily two purposes: (1) wage and hour
protections under the FLSA, and (2) anti-discrimination employment statutes. The analysis under the FLSA rests to some
note 64, at 452 (noting the “pervasiveness of voluntarism in the United
States”); Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 148 (“[V]oluntarism is critically important to the welfare of this country, particularly in these days of everincreasing budget cuts.”). See generally ELLIS & NOYES, supra note 57 (providing a history of volunteers in the United States since 1607).
71. Volunteering in the United States—2013, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU
OF LAB. STAT. (Feb. 25, 2014), at 1, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
pdf/volun.pdf. The Bureau of Labor Statistics defines volunteers as “persons
who did unpaid work (except for expenses) through or for an organization,” a
definition that includes traditional volunteers as well as unpaid interns. Id.
72. ELLIS & NOYES, supra note 57, at 314–48.
73. Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 148.
74. Attard, supra note 70, at 1089.
75. Steven Greenhouse, Jobs Few, Grads Flock to Unpaid Internships,
N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/business/
unpaid-internships-dont-always-deliver.html.
76. Ortner, supra note 60, at 2616–21. Ortner notes that the “cheap labor”
function may violate the FLSA. Id. at 2620.
77. See Dunn, supra note 64, at 452.
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degree on a firm statutory and regulatory framework, whereas
the analysis under anti-discrimination statutes continues to
develop chiefly through case law.
1. VOLUNTEERS UNDER THE FLSA
The Supreme Court explicitly addressed the employment
status of volunteers in the 1985 decision Tony & Susan Alamo
78
Foundation v. Secretary of Labor. In this case a nonprofit religious organization operated several commercial businesses,
which it staffed with former addicts, criminals, and derelicts
79
the organization had rehabilitated. The Foundation did not
pay the workers wages or salary, but did provide food, shelter,
80
clothing, transportation, and medical benefits. In considering
whether the workers were employees under the FLSA, the
Court relied upon the holding in Walling v. Portland Terminal
81
Co. In that case, the Court ruled that the FLSA’s definition of
“employ” as “suffer or permit to work” “was obviously not intended to stamp all persons as employees who, without any express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their
82
own advantage on the premises of another.” In contrast to the
railroad trainees in Walling, however, the Court found that the
Foundation’s volunteers “were ‘entirely dependent upon the
Foundation for long periods [of time]’” because they received
83
compensation in the form of significant benefits. The fact that
the workers strongly protested their classification as employees
84
held little weight for the Court. Although this decision raised
concern about the potentially debilitating effects to charitable
85
organizations that rely heavily upon volunteer work, the
Court emphasized that the Department of Labor’s current approach would not transform services “of the kind typically asso-

78. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
79. Id. at 292.
80. Id. at 292–93.
81. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 299–300 (citing Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150 (1947)).
82. Walling, 330 U.S. at 152 (citing the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (1946)).
83. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 301 (quoting Donovan v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 567 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.D. Ark. 1982)).
84. Id. at 302.
85. See Dunn, supra note 64, at 458.
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86

ciated with volunteer work” into labor protected by the
87
FLSA.
The 1985 Amendments to the FLSA added a definition of
“volunteer,” but the definition applies only to volunteers at pub88
lic agencies. The amendment allows volunteers at public
agencies to receive reimbursed expenses, reasonable benefits,
and nominal fees without becoming employees under the
89
FLSA. FLSA regulations specify that allowable payments include: reimbursements for expenses; books, supplies, or other
materials essential to volunteer training; coverage under group
insurance plans, including health insurance, life insurance,
disability insurance, worker’s compensation, and pension plans;
90
and nominal fees not tied to productivity. These payments
remain subject to an examination of “the total amount of payments made . . . in the context of the economic realities of the
91
situation.”
As the Alamo Court noted, the Department of Labor continues to recognize “ordinary volunteerism” as falling outside
92
the FLSA’s jurisdiction. In its Field Operation Handbook, the
Department of Labor acknowledges that “the nature of religious, charitable and similar nonprofit organizations, and
schools is such that individuals may volunteer their services in
one capacity or another, usually on a part-time basis, not as
93
employees or in contemplation of pay.” The Handbook lists
several volunteer activities that are unlikely to trigger an employment relationship, including helping at a shelter, providing
services for the sick and elderly, and working at a school li94
brary or cafeteria.
An entirely different set of standards applies to for-profit
private sector employers. The FLSA prohibits for-profit businesses from accepting volunteer services unless the volunteer

86. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 303 n.25.
87. Id. at 302–03.
88. Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 4, 99 Stat. 787 (1985) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 203(4)(A) (2012)).
89. Id.
90. 29 C.F.R. § 553.106 (2012).
91. Id. § 553.106(f).
92. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 302–03 & n.25.
93. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK 10b03(c) (1993),
available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/FOH/FOH_Ch10.pdf [hereinafter FIELD
OPERATIONS HANDBOOK].
94. Id.
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95

meets the six criteria of an intern/trainee. These criteria attempt to ensure that the work arrangement primarily benefits
the intern rather than the employer and provides no immediate
96
advantage to the employer. Establishing all six criteria can be
difficult and theoretically should preclude private employers
97
from utilizing “free labor.” Some scholars, however, suggest
that although many employers classify unpaid interns as
“trainees” under the FLSA, this classification often ignores the
requirement that employers derive no advantage from the in98
tern. Moreover, this six-factor test is not binding on courts,
99
and some courts elect not to use it. Among courts that do apply the test, only some require all six factors to avoid a finding
100
of employee status. Others, like the Tenth Circuit, favor a
“totality of the circumstances” approach that considers each
factor but only requires most of them to demonstrate a worker
101
is a legally unpaid intern.
2. VOLUNTEERS UNDER ANTI-DISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT
STATUTES
The circuit courts disagree over which test to apply when
confronted with a volunteer or unpaid intern claiming employ-

95. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 1 (2010) [hereinafter
FACT SHEET #71], available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/
whdfs71.pdf (listing the requirements for an unpaid internship as: (1) similar
to training in an educational environment, (2) for the benefit of the intern, (3)
does not displace regular employees, (4) employer derives no immediate advantage from intern’s activities, (5) intern not necessarily entitled to a job at
internship’s conclusion, and (6) employer and intern understand that intern is
not entitled to wages); see also Tip of the Month: Interns, Volunteers, and Employees: Are You in Compliance? (Proskauer Rose Emp’t Law Counseling &
Training Practice Grp., New York, N. Y.), June 2011, available at
http://www.proskauer.com/files/News/dc18a00a-d961-4da1-b275
-37af8d1ef8d7/Presentation/NewsAttachment/73b0c435-5e26-483d-9bc039cf5398adbe/Employment-Law-Counseling-Tip-of-the-Month-February-2014Update.pdf.
96. See FACT SHEET #71, supra note 95.
97. See Richard Tuschman, Using Volunteers and Interns: Is It Legal?,
FORBES (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardtuschman/2012/
08/24/using-volunteers-and-interns-is-it-legal.
98. See Ortner, supra note 60, at 2620.
99. David C. Yamada, The Legal and Social Movement Against Unpaid
Internships 4–5 (Suffolk Univ. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 13-34, 2013),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2338646.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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102

The majority of circuits use a thresholdee status.
remuneration test that requires an initial showing of substantial compensation before applying the multi-factor common law
103
agency test. A minority of circuits treat remuneration as one
of many non-dispositive factors that must be examined togeth104
er.
a. Threshold-Remuneration Test
The leading case establishing the threshold-remuneration
105
test is Graves v. Women’s Professional Rodeo Ass’n. The defendant WPRA sanctioned rodeo barrel races that met its
standards and required its members to adhere to certain rules
106
when competing in its approved events. WPRA’s membership
was restricted to females, and the plaintiff Graves, a male bar107
rel racer, brought a Title VII suit alleging sex discrimination.
WPRA defended the suit on the grounds that it did not have
the requisite fifteen employees to fall under Title VII’s jurisdic108
tion. Graves contested that WPRA’s members were its em109
ployees. Rather than immediately initiating a common law
agency analysis, the court consulted the dictionary definitions
of “employee,” “employer,” and “employ” and found that
“[c]entral to the meaning of these words is the idea of compen110
sation in exchange for services.” As a result, the court concluded that compensation “is an essential condition to the existence of an employer-employee relationship” and that a multifactor common law or economic realities analysis should apply
“only in situations that plausibly approximate an employment
111
relationship.” Because WPRA’s members received no compensation, their relationship did not plausibly rise to that between
an employer and employee and a common law agency analysis
112
was unnecessary.
102. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 435 (5th
Cir. 2013) (describing the circuit split over which test should be used to distinguish between volunteers and employees).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990).
106. Id. at 72.
107. Id. at 71–72.
108. Id. at 72.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 73.
111. Id. at 73–74.
112. Id. at 73. Although the barrel race winners received a money prize,
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The Second Circuit followed the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning
in O’Connor v. Davis, where a student intern sued for sex dis113
crimination under Title VII. The court found application of
the common law agency test to determine O’Connor’s employment status inappropriate “because it ignores the antecedent
114
question of whether O’Connor was hired.” The court ruled
that no hire occurred in this case, because O’Connor received
no salary, wages, or benefits, nor was she promised such com115
pensation. As a result, the court found O’Connor was not an
116
employee under Title VII.
Following Graves and O’Connor, several other courts of appeals adopted the threshold-remuneration test in cases where a
117
voluntarily unpaid worker claims employee status.
b. Compensation as a Non-dispositive Factor Within Common
Law Agency Test
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have rejected the thresholdremuneration test in favor of a common law test that includes
118
compensation as one of several non-dispositive factors. In
Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Department, Inc., an employee of the Fire Department sued for sex discrimination un119
der Title VII. The Fire Department argued it was not an employer under Title VII because it did not have fifteen employees
120
for the relevant time period. Bryson countered that the Fire
121
Department’s firefighter-members were employees. The district court applied the threshold-remuneration test and concluded that the firefighters’ benefits did not constitute suffinon-WPRA members could also compete and receive the prize. Id. Moreover,
the prize money did not come from WPRA, but rather from the sponsor of the
particular rodeo and the competitors’ entry fees. Id.
113. 126 F.3d 112, 113–14 (2d Cir. 1997).
114. Id. at 115.
115. Id. at 116.
116. Id.
117. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 439 (5th
Cir. 2013); Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1243–44
(11th Cir. 1998); McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 170 F.3d 974, 979
(10th Cir. 1998); Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211, 222
(4th Cir. 1993).
118. See Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 354
(6th Cir. 2011); Waisgerber v. City of L.A., 406 F. App’x 150, 152 (9th Cir.
2010); Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008).
119. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 350.
120. Id. at 351.
121. Id. at 350–51.

BODTKE_4fmt

1/6/2015 3:00 PM

2015] WHEN VOLUNTEERS BECOME EMPLOYEES

1129
122

cient compensation to raise a factual issue for the jury. The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the district court’s adoption of the threshold-remuneration test in er123
ror.
In explaining its reversal, the court of appeals questioned
the precedent on which the majority of circuits based its understanding of remuneration as an independent antecedent factor.
The opinion criticized the O’Connor court’s reliance on the term
124
“hired party” in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid
as support for establishing a threshold requirement of substan125
tial compensation. The court instead emphasized the Reid
Court’s instruction to apply the common law of agency “‘when
126
Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without defining it,’”
observing that the instruction made no exception for cases lack127
ing remuneration. The court also noted that considering remuneration as one of several non-dispositive factors comported
with Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden’s statement
that “all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed
128
and weighed with no one factor being decisive.” The court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings that
129
weighed common law factors in addition to remuneration.
Legal commentators dispute the relative merits of the
threshold-remuneration test versus treating remuneration as
one of several non-dispositive factors. Mitchell Rubinstein advocates the uniform adoption of the threshold-remuneration
test to determine whether a volunteer is an employee, emphasizing its practicality and adoption by the National Labor Rela130
tions Board (NLRB), the quasi-judicial body that decides cas122. Id. at 351.
123. Id. at 353.
124. 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989).
125. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 354; O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir.
1997).
126. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 354 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 739–40).
127. Id.
128. Id. (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id. at 355–56.
130. Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 179. For an overview of the NLRB cases
applying the same two-step test used in the threshold-remuneration test, see
Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, No. 13-RC-121359, slip op.
at 13–17 (N.L.R.B. March 26, 2014), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/
link/document.aspx/09031d4581667b6f (analyzing compensation before analyzing control factors and concluding that only the football players receiving
scholarships were employees under the Act); In re Seattle Opera Ass’n, 331
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131

es under the NLRA in administrative proceedings. Christopher Morgan, in contrast, argues that the Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ “all the factors” approach better accords with Supreme
132
Court precedent. This debate represents an additional complication to the already inconsistent and unpredictable legal
framework for determining employee status. Because the multi-factor approach represents the status quo for determining
employment status under Title VII and other federal employment statutes, this Note analyzes the reasons for and against
diverging from that status quo with the thresholdremuneration test. As the next Part will demonstrate, the
threshold-remuneration test offers a potentially logical and
clear test that overcomes much of the unpredictability inherent
in the Sixth Circuit’s “all the factors” approach. The thresholdremuneration test, however, needs a more precise definition of
“remuneration” that accords with the FLSA in order to avoid
becoming yet another indeterminate and inconsistent standard
to decide employee status.
II. THE PROBLEMS OF THE THRESHOLDREMUNERATION TEST THREATEN TO UNDERMINE ITS
BENEFITS
This Part examines the advantages, criticisms, and deficiencies of the threshold-remuneration test as a method to determine the employment status of voluntarily unpaid workers.
Section A discusses the threshold-remuneration test’s benefits
of logic and efficiency in contrast to multi-factor tests’ incompatibility with volunteer situations and unpredictability. Section B addresses and counters two leading criticisms of the
threshold-remuneration test: (1) overemphasis on the Reid
Court’s “hired party” language, and (2) violation of precedent.
Section C then explains the more serious problems with the
threshold-remuneration test: (1) an inconsistent definition of
compensation, and (2) incongruity with the FLSA. This Part
concludes that while the threshold-remuneration test offers a
N.L.R.B. 1072, 1073 (2000) (examining remuneration before other factors in
finding that auxiliary opera choristers were employees), aff’d, 292 F.3d 757
(D.C. Cir. 2002); WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 1273 (1999) (concluding
that no employment relationship existed where there was no compensation for
unpaid staff and that no further test needed to be applied).
131. The Board, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/
who-we-are/board (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
132. Morgan, supra note 25, at 1234–35.
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potential method to clarify the definition of “employee” in volunteer contexts, it suffers from its failure to delineate the
meaning of “remuneration” and its failure to coincide with the
FLSA’s regulations for determining when a volunteer becomes
an employee.
A. THE THRESHOLD-REMUNERATION APPROACH REFOCUSES
THE MEANING OF EMPLOYMENT AND SIMPLIFIES THE
EMPLOYMENT STATUS DETERMINATION
Case law suggests several reasons for applying the threshold-remuneration test to volunteer situations. First, the
threshold-remuneration test calls attention to the core feature
of employment relationships: compensation. Second, the test
recognizes that control, the focus of the common law agency
test, loses its significance when compensation is not evident.
Third, the threshold-remuneration approach simplifies the process of identifying an employee by avoiding the multi-factor
analysis when no plausible employment relationship exists.
1. The Threshold-Remuneration Test Recognizes the
Centrality of Compensation to the Employment Relationship
The threshold-remuneration test emphasizes the importance of compensation by making it an antecedent requirement to conducting a common law agency analysis. The Graves
court developed this approach by consulting the dictionary definitions of “employee,” “employer,” and “employ” before diving
133
immediately into a common law agency analysis. Analyzing
the dictionary definitions, the court noted that “[c]entral to the
meaning of these words is the idea of compensation in exchange
134
for services.” The NLRB also referred to the dictionary definitions of “employee” and “employ” in WBAI Pacifica Foundation,
a case where unpaid staff claimed they should be included in a
135
collective bargaining agreement under the NLRA. The NLRB
relied on NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, where the Supreme Court looked to various dictionary definitions of “em136
ployee” in analyzing the NLRA. Because those dictionary def133. Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 72–73 (8th Cir.
1990) (pointing out that statutory definitions’ “quite spartan and circular nature . . . seem to leave no other route” than relying upon the words’ ordinary
usage).
134. Graves, 907 F.2d at 73.
135. WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. at 1274.
136. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995); WBAI
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initions all included compensation, the NLRB concluded that
137
an employment relationship requires an economic aspect.
This return to dictionary definitions clarifies the complicated employee question by focusing on the fundamental meaning of employment, whereas multi-factor tests disregard compensation’s fundamental role by treating it as one of many
factors. The ordinary meanings of “employee” and related
138
words, as shown by dictionary definitions, indisputably feature compensation as a central component of the employment
concept—not just a relevant element. Moreover, the dictionary
definitions accord with societal perceptions of the distinction
between volunteers and employees. As Ellis and Noyes’ defini139
tion of “volunteer” indicates, a key feature of volunteering is
140
“no personal economic gain.” Employment, on the other hand,
141
rests on an economic exchange. Without compensation, a relationship shifts from one of economic exchange to one of freely
142
offered services that generate their own intrinsic value.
Admittedly, in unpaid intern situations, the absence of
monetary compensation does not automatically imply a disin143
terested donation without expectation of extrinsic reward.
Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. at 1274.
137. WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. at 1274–75. Mitchell Rubinstein
argues that the NLRB essentially adopted the threshold-remuneration test in
this case. Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 178.
138. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines employee as “one employed by another usu[ally] for wages or salary and in a position below the executive level.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 408 (11th ed.
2003). “Employ” is defined: “to use or engage the services of” and “to provide
with a job that pays wages or a salary.” Id. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
employee as a “person who works in the service of another person (the employer) under an express or implied contract of hire, under which the employer has
the right to control the details of work performance.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 602 (9th ed. 2009). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “hire” as “[t]o engage
the labor or services of another for wages or other payment.” Id. at 799.
139. “To volunteer is to choose to act in recognition of a need, with an attitude of social responsibility and without concern for monetary profit, going beyond one’s basic obligations.” ELLIS & NOYES, supra note 57, at 4.
140. Id. at 4–5.
141. See WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. at 1275 (“[T]o work for hire is
to receive compensation for labor or services.”); James E. Brennan, Money
Buys Labor, Not Love, COMPENSATION CAFÉ (July 10, 2013, 9:12 AM), http://
www.compensationcafe.com/2013/07/money-buys-labor-not-love.html (“[L]abor
is purchased by money.”).
142. Cf. Brennan, supra note 141 (“Once a price-tag is placed on a task, it
tends to be leached of intrinsic value. Involving money alters the transaction
into a negotiation over extrinsic market terms.”).
143. See Ortner, supra note 60, at 2618 (arguing that college graduates
find it challenging to gain full-time employment without internship experi-
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Unpaid interns labor in part out of the expectation of future
144
economic returns. That being said, economic exchange is still
lacking if the unpaid internship adheres to the Department of
Labor regulation that an employer “derive[] no immediate ad145
Because the FLSAvantage” from the intern’s activities.
compliant employer receives nothing, there is no exchange and
therefore no compensation, which Black’s Law Dictionary defines as “[r]emuneration and other benefits received in return
146
for services rendered.” Thus, if the employer receives nothing
in exchange for giving the intern job experience and career opportunities, no employment relationship exists.
2. The Threshold-Remuneration Test Recognizes that Control
Loses Significance when Compensation Is Absent
In establishing compensation as a dispositive factor, the
threshold-remuneration test appropriately adjusts the employee inquiry away from control in volunteer situations. Courts determining employment status historically applied the common
law agency test with its focus on control because most cases
disputed whether an individual was an employee or independent contractor, a distinction where control is the defining fac147
tor. Yet, as the Haavistola court noted, “[c]ontrol loses some
of its significance . . . in those situations in which compensation
ence); Yamada, supra note 21, at 217 (noting that internship experience is essentially required as part of a professional education).
144. See Greenhouse, supra note 75 (“[M]any college graduates who expected to land paid jobs are turning to unpaid internships to try to get a foot in
an employer’s door.”); Michelle Hackeman, Many Students Debate the Value of
Unpaid Internships, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (July 14, 2013, 12:00 AM),
http://www.post-gazette.com/hp_mobile/2013/07/14/Many-students-debate-the
-value-of-unpaid-internships/stories/201307140181 (“[C]ollege students and
employers have increasingly regarded internships as stepping stones on the
way to full-time employment, so much so that the internship has come to replace a traditional entry-level position.”).
145. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 95, at 1. Commentators have noted, however, that this criterion is particularly difficult to establish, Tuschman, supra
note 97, and that many employers classify their interns as non-employees even
though the employer does derive benefit from the interns’ work, Ortner, supra
note 60, at 2620. Others have criticized this criterion for disregarding unpaid
internships’ long-term advantages to employers, including generating goodwill
and training future employees on a cost-free basis. Craig Durrant, Comment,
To Benefit or Not To Benefit: Mutually Induced Consideration As a Test for the
Legality of Unpaid Internships, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 178 (2013).
146. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 138, at 322 (emphasis added).
147. Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 220 (4th
Cir. 1993); Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795 (E.D. Pa.
1987).
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148

is not evident.” Control, as the Graves court observed, exists
in many relationships that do not give rise to employment status; a university, for example, exercises control over its students, and a credit card company imposes rules on its card
149
members. Volunteers also typically experience a high degree
150
of control over their activities. Consequently, under a typical
control test, even the most traditional, “pure” volunteer could
meet the definition of employee, regardless of the absence of
151
any expectation or receipt of compensation. Such an outcome
disregards the centrality of compensation in the employment
152
relationship and inflates the significance of control.
Moreover, even though control clearly exists in volunteer
contexts, its capacity for abuse by employers decreases in volunteer situations. The court in Smith v. Berks Community Television reasoned that because volunteers do not rely on the organization they serve for their livelihood, they “are not
susceptible to the discriminatory practices which the Act [Title
153
VII] was designed to eliminate.” Because a volunteer does not
depend upon his or her volunteer work to pay the bills, the volunteer holds greater bargaining power than a typical employee.
For instance, the volunteer can leave the position without immediate financial consequences, and in doing so deprive the
154
employer of the benefits of free labor. Therefore, control in a
pure volunteer context imposes fewer risks of ongoing discrimination than in an employment relationship, further diminish148. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 220.
149. Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990).
150. See HERMAN, supra note 67, at 13–17 (describing strategies for managing volunteer services, including providing explicit direction, supervising
activities, and establishing policies).
151. Cf. Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 172 (“[S]imply because a volunteer in
a hospital gift shop is directly under the control of an administrator . . . may
say nothing with respect to whether or not he is an employee if he or she receives absolutely nothing in return.”).
152. See supra Part II.A.1.
153. Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795 (E.D. Pa.
1987).
154. See Peter J. Eide, Volunteers and Employment Law, in THE VOLUNTEER MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 339, 340–41 (Tracy Daniel Connors ed., 1995).
But see O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1997) (recognizing that
student interns may not be “in quite the same position to simply walk away
from . . . alleged harassment as are many other volunteers”); Kpere-Daibo, supra note 21, at 148–50 (arguing that volunteers are vulnerable to discriminatory behavior because their motives for volunteering may be strong enough to
tolerate such abuse, and because employers are more likely to abuse unpaid
workers because of their temporary status).
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ing control’s importance to a test distinguishing between volunteers and employees. The threshold-remuneration test properly
shifts the focus towards compensation and away from control, a
factor that, while important to the employee-independent contractor distinction, carries less weight in volunteer situations.
3. The Threshold-Remuneration Test Avoids the
Indeterminate Multi-factor Analysis
Using remuneration as a dispositive factor not only recognizes compensation’s centrality in the employment relationship
but also simplifies the method of determining when an individual is an employee. If a plaintiff fails to establish sufficient remuneration, the court need not delve into an indeterminate test
155
of non-weighted, non-dispositive factors. Such an approach
156
enhances both judicial efficiency and predictability. Specifically, the court avoids a lengthy analysis of anywhere from six
to thirteen additional factors if compensation is clearly ab157
sent. The test also improves predictability by clarifying when
158
someone is clearly not an employee. Overall, the thresholdremuneration lends much-needed clarity and certainty to the
increasingly complicated question of employment status.
Although the test’s adoption of one dispositive factor will
prove determinative in only some circumstances, it still generates greater predictability than the existing scheme. Moreover,
the threshold-remuneration test reorients courts to the fundamental definition of an “employee” by shifting the focus to compensation rather than control in volunteer contexts. Despite the
155. See Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir.
1990).
156. See Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 179 (“The two-step approach of the
NLRB seems to be the most practical test for distinguishing between volunteers and employees.”).
157. Compare Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431,
439–40 (halting its analysis after finding the plaintiff’s benefits did not constitute sufficient remuneration), with Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157,
1160–61 (9th Cir. 2008) (analyzing six factors in addition to remuneration
even after finding the putative employees did not receive substantial compensation).
158. See Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 154 (“When volunteers receive absolutely nothing in return, courts do not seem to have much difficulty in concluding that they are volunteers . . . .”); Castagnera et al., supra note 16 (recommending that human resources keep careful track of all forms of compensation
for volunteers); Stephen M. Flanagan, Tip of the Month: Employment Laws
and Interns, 31 No. 7 FLETCHER CORP. L. ADVISER 14 (July 2013) (“The key[]
for employers to avoid turning interns into employees . . . [is] . . . no or insignificant remuneration . . . .”).
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threshold-remuneration test’s practical adoption of one dispositive factor, the test has received criticism about its precedential
basis. Moreover, the test continues to suffer from inconsistency
in application and incongruity with the major federal employment statute addressing compensation: the FLSA.
B. THE THRESHOLD-REMUNERATION TEST NEITHER OVEREMPHASIZES REID’S “HIRED” LANGUAGE NOR VIOLATES
PRECEDENT
Despite the threshold-remuneration test’s logic and comparative simplicity in defining the employment relationship, it
has not escaped criticism. The Sixth Circuit refused to adopt
the threshold-remuneration approach on the grounds that other circuits overemphasized the substantive meaning of “hired
159
party” as used by the Supreme Court. Some courts and scholars similarly challenge the threshold-remuneration’s precedential foundation, pointing out that prior Supreme Court decisions assert no one factor is decisive in analyzing the
160
employment relationship. These criticisms, however, misinterpret Supreme Court precedent and overlook the logical
foundations of the threshold-remuneration test.
1. The Threshold-Remuneration Test Does Not OverEmphasize the Term “Hired Party”
In Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Department, the
Sixth Circuit questioned the majority’s reasoning for adopting
161
remuneration as an “independent antecedent inquiry.” The
court disagreed with O’Connor that the term “hired party” in
key Supreme Court cases distinguishing employees from inde162
pendent contractors signified anything substantive about the
163
meaning of “employee” or the role of remuneration. The Sixth
Circuit pointed out that the Reid Court defined “hiring party”
purely in terms of the Copyright Act as “‘the party who claims
ownership of the copyright by virtue of the work for hire doc-

159. Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 354
(6th Cir. 2011).
160. Id.; Morgan, supra note 25, at 1234–35.
161. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 353.
162. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); O’Connor v. Davis, 126
F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1997).
163. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 354.
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164

trine.’” Such a definition, the Sixth Circuit reasoned, undercut any inference that the term “hired party” carries any mean165
ingful weight outside the Copyright Act.
The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation, however, views “hired
party” too narrowly and overlooks the consistent logic of requiring a “hire” before engaging in a full-fledged application of the
common law test. First, the Bryson court dismissed the Supreme Court’s application of the “hired party” language to a
case outside the scope of the Copyright Act in Darden, where
166
the statute at issue was ERISA. Although the term “hired
party” originated from the Copyright Act, the Supreme Court
did not hesitate to transfer the language or concept to other
employment contexts. Second, the Bryson court failed to recognize the rudimentary meaning of “hire” and its presumed existence in both employee and independent contractor contexts.
“Hire” means “[t]o engage the labor or services of another for
167
wages or other payment.” Both an employee and an independent contractor in the vast majority of cases meet this defi168
nition. The common law agency test itself assumes this base169
This factor
line with the factor “method of payment.”
presumes the existence of compensation and delineates between employees and independent contractors solely upon the
170
method by which such compensation is paid. In volunteer
contexts, however, courts cannot similarly presume the exist171
ence of compensation or a hire. A preliminary investigation
into whether a “hire” has even occurred simply recognizes the
assumption under which courts already determine employee
status. The Sixth Circuit, by over-analyzing the origins of the
term “hired party,” fails to recognize its broader use by the Supreme Court and its logical role in defining “employee.”

164. Id. (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 738 n.6).
165. Id.
166. Id.; Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24.
167. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 138, at 799.
168. See Rubinstein, supra note 17, at 618–19 (“Outside cases involving
volunteers, there is usually no issue with respect to whether a hiring took
place or whether remuneration is received.”).
169. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989).
170. See BALES ET AL., supra note 10, at 9.
171. See Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 172 (“[T]he employment status of
volunteers has very little to do with the issue of whether or not someone is an
independent contractor.”).

BODTKE_4fmt

1138

1/6/2015 3:00 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:1113

2. The Threshold-Remuneration Test Does Not Violate
Precedent
In rejecting the threshold-remuneration test, the Sixth
Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s assertion in Reid that
“when Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without defining
it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by
172
common-law agency doctrine.” The Ninth Circuit similarly
173
noted in opting out of the threshold-remuneration test the
Supreme Court’s statement in Clackamas that the outcome of
common law test depends on “‘all of the incidents of the rela174
tionship . . . with no one factor being decisive.’” Morgan argues that the Supreme Court provided a directive in Clackamas
that all employment factors must be analyzed together with no
175
one factor being dispositive. Morgan further points out that
the Clackamas Court included remuneration as one of six factors to determine the alleged employees’ status in that case, arguing therefore that remuneration cannot be an antecedent re176
quirement. These criticisms raise the question whether the
177
threshold-remuneration test ignores binding precedent.
Such criticism, however, misinterprets the import of the
Clackamas decision. Rather than compelling an all-the-factors
approach, the decision recognizes the legitimacy of adopting a
new test for a novel situation. In Clackamas, the Court addressed whether four physician-shareholders of a medical clinic
were employees, acknowledging that professional corporations
178
have “no exact precedent in the common law.” As a result, the
Court adopted six new factors promulgated by the EEOC to analyze the narrow and novel question of whether a shareholder
179
is an employee. This divergence from the traditional list of
172. Reid, 490 U.S. at 739–40; Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dept.,
Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2011).
173. Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008); Morgan,
supra note 25, at 1232.
174. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 451
(2003) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992)).
175. Morgan, supra note 25, at 1238.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 1239 (noting the “all the factors” test “comports with Supreme Court precedent and should therefore be given more credence”).
178. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 442, 447.
179. Id. at 448–49. The six new factors were: (1) whether the organization
can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and regulations of the individual’s work; (2) whether and to what extent the organization supervises the individual’s work; (3) whether the individual reports to someone higher in the or-
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factors indicates the Supreme Court’s recognition that new,
modified tests are appropriate for scenarios outside the typical
180
employee-independent contractor distinction. The Clackamas
test, although rooted in agency law, represents a modification
of the Supreme Court’s past application of the common law
agency test. In this particular situation, the Court adhered to
the non-dispositive all-the-factors approach that Morgan characterizes as binding, but the Court’s willingness to adjust its
analysis for non-traditional employment situations reveals that
traditional multi-factor tests may not be binding in volunteer
181
contexts.
Morgan further argues, however, that because the Clackamas Court specifically included remuneration—defined as
“whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities”—as one of its non-dispositive factors, precedent bars mak182
ing remuneration an antecedent requirement. This interpretation, however, overlooks the fact that “remuneration” as
defined in Clackamas weighed against a finding of employment
183
for the shareholders. The Court was not inquiring as to the
preliminary existence of payment, but as to how this payment
was calculated: as a salary, or as a share of the company’s prof184
its. Thus, including the sharing of profits as a non-dispositive
factor in the Clackamas analysis hardly precludes courts from
treating basic remuneration as a threshold factor.
C. THE THRESHOLD-REMUNERATION APPROACH FAILS TO
DEFINE “REMUNERATION” AND GENERATES RESULTS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE FLSA
Although the threshold-remuneration test overcomes these
critiques of its precedential foundation, other, yet unacknowledged problems exist with the test that could undercut its beneganization; (4) whether and to what extent the individual is able to influence
the organization; (5) whether the parties intended that the individual be an
employee, as expressed in written agreements or contracts; and (6) whether
the individual shared in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the organization.
Id. at 449–50.
180. Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 173.
181. See id.
182. Morgan, supra note 25, at 1238.
183. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450–51 (“Some of the District Court’s findings
. . . appear to weigh in favor of a conclusion that the four director-shareholder
physicians in this case are not employees of the clinic. For example . . . they
share the profits . . . .”).
184. See id.
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fits of logic and efficiency. First, it remains unclear what con185
stitutes significant remuneration, both because courts tend to
186
apply the standard differently and because new factual sce187
narios likely will arise. Second, the threshold-remuneration
presents the same problematic phenomenon as many other
tests in the employment arena that find an employment rela188
tionship under one statute but not another.
1. The Definition of “Significant Remuneration” Is Unclear
The threshold-remuneration test suffers from an unclear
definition of “remuneration.” The Fourth Circuit observed in
Haavistola that “compensation is not defined by statute or case
189
law.” The Juino court, in contrast, offered a definition of remuneration as “either direct compensation, such as a salary or
wages, or indirect benefits that are not merely incidental to the
190
activity performed.” Even this definition, however, produces
uncertainty. Partly as a result of little precedent and partly because of courts’ reluctance to draw definite lines around the
remunerative concept, the threshold-remuneration “test pro191
vides very little guidance in its practical application.”
Some case comparisons demonstrate this unpredictability.
In two similar cases involving volunteer firefighters, one plain192
193
tiff established employment status while the other did not.
185. See Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 157 (noting that “each case is fact
specific”); Gwinn Clay, supra note 19 (considering several hypothetical variations of the factual scenario in Juino and concluding “we don’t know” what
meets the threshold of remuneration).
186. Compare O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997) (analyzing whether the plaintiff received a salary, wages, or benefits), with Rafi v.
Thompson, No. 02-2356, 2006 WL 3091483, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2006) (analyzing whether the volunteer position afforded future career opportunities
with the employer).
187. See Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 179 (predicting the two-step test
may be difficult to apply in certain scenarios).
188. See, e.g., Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 776–77 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (Randolph, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s finding of an employment relationship under the NLRA incorrectly necessitated that the employer violated federal tax laws and the Fair Labor Standards Act); DUNLOP
COMMISSION, supra note 20 (recognizing that “each major labor and employment statute . . . has its own definition of employee”).
189. Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211, 221 (4th Cir.
1993).
190. Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir.
2013).
191. Gwinn Clay, supra note 19.
192. Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d
468, 473 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Although this difference may be partly attributable to proce194
dural differences (one case was decided by bench trial and the
195
other by jury trial ), it still indicates the malleability of “remuneration.” In these two cases, the plaintiffs’ indirect benefits
overlapped in three categories (disability insurance, life insurance, and death benefits), and each also received other benefits
196
beyond those they shared. Yet only one plaintiff was found to
197
be an employee.
A possible explanation for this difference is the court’s
opinion in Pietras that the plaintiff’s retirement pension represented a “considerably more generous” benefit than what the
198
plaintiff in Haavistola received. It remains unclear, however,
why Haavistola’s numerous benefits, which exceeded in number the benefits Pietras received, failed to make up for the retirement pension. Without guidance from more cases, employers and volunteers will have difficulty predicting whether a
plaintiff in Haavistola’s position is an employee, or whether a
plaintiff that receives a retirement pension but nothing else can
establish employment status. Most likely, courts will continue
to reach different outcomes and foster employment law’s noto199
riously indeterminate stance on employee status.
Courts have also been inconsistent in cases where the putative employee/volunteer receives cash payments. For example, the court in Juino interpreted $2 per call, amounting to
200
201
$78 over the course of Juino’s four-month tenure, as “purely
193. Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 839 F. Supp. 372, 373 (D.
Md. 1994).
194. Pietras, 180 F.3d at 470.
195. Haavistola, 839 F. Supp. at 373.
196. Pietras, 180 F.3d at 471; Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6
F.3d 211, 221 (4th Cir. 1993).
197. Pietras, 180 F.3d at 473; Haavistola, 839 F. Supp. at 373.
198. Pietras, 180 F.3d at 473 & n.6; cf. Morgan, supra note 25, at 20 (drawing a distinction between benefits that have no immediate value, like life insurance or disability insurance, and benefits that provide more immediate financial gain, like a retirement pension).
199. For a more recent division between courts on what “significant remuneration” means, compare Finkle v. Howard Cnty., Md., CIV. No. JKB-133236, 2014 WL 1396386, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 10, 2014) (finding disability and
life insurance to be significant remuneration even though such benefits accrue
only upon injury or death), with Holder v. Town of Bristol, No. 3:09–CV–32
PPS, 2009 WL 3004552, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 17, 2009) (finding similar “lineof-duty” benefits insufficient because they “are not guaranteed forms of remuneration”).
200. Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 431, 439
(5th Cir. 2013).
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202

incidental to her volunteer service.” In contrast, the D.C. Cir203
cuit in Seattle Opera v. NLRB found that auxiliary choristers
who received a flat sum of $214 per production received com204
pensation sufficient to give rise to employment status. Although at first glance the difference between $78 and $214 appears substantial, the choristers’ $214 payment covered seven
music rehearsals, seven stage rehearsals, and eight performances, which amounted to seventy-seven hours of work, at a
205
rate of $2.78 an hour. Thus, the amount the choristers received per hour only slightly exceeded the amount Juino received per call. Regardless of this comparable payment, the
choristers established employee status, while Juino did not.
Even assuming each of Juino’s fire calls lasted three hours,
representing payment of $0.66 per hour, there would be only a
$2 difference per hour from the choristers’ rate of pay. It is unclear where within that $2 range an individual shifts from volunteer to employee. Such uncertainty contributes to the environment of unpredictability in which employers and volunteers
operate.
An additional inconsistency in defining “remuneration” is
the question of whether non-financial benefits constitute compensation. In In re Seattle Opera Ass’n, the NLRB based its
holding that the auxiliary choristers were employees partly on
the fact that performing as an auxiliary chorister often led to
206
becoming a paid regular chorister. The plaintiff in Rafi v.
Thompson similarly made a preliminary showing of employee
status when he demonstrated that a volunteer position at the
National Institute of Health provided a clear pathway to employment at the Institute, as well as the training necessary to
fulfill the requirements of the American Board of Medical Ge-

201. Brief of Appellant at 4, Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5,
717 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-30274), 2012 WL 3023864.
202. Juino, 717 F.3d at 440.
203. Although the D.C. Circuit has neither explicitly adopted nor rejected
the threshold-remuneration test, it appeared to follow the NLRB’s example
and adopt the threshold-remuneration test in Seattle Opera. Rubinstein, supra
note 25, at 178–79.
204. Seattle Opera v. N.L.R.B., 292 F.3d 757, 764–65 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
205. Id. at 773.
206. In re Seattle Opera Ass’n, 331 N.L.R.B. 148, 1073 (2000), aff’d, 292
F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In affirming this decision, the D.C. Circuit did not
rely on career opportunities to establish the presence of compensation, focusing solely on the $214 flat fee. Seattle Opera, 292 F.3d at 762–63.
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207

netics. The EEOC also supports this broader interpretation of
remuneration. The EEOC states that a volunteer may be covered under Title VII if the volunteer work is required for regular employment or regularly leads to employment with the
208
same entity.
With more courts indicating that non-financial benefits
like education, work experience, and job opportunities constitute compensation, the definition of remuneration becomes
even more blurred. This trend of including non-financial benefits within the definition of compensation further begs the
question which non-financial benefits should constitute significant remuneration, and which should be considered merely “in209
210
cidental” benefits or emotional rewards, neither of which
weigh in favor of an employment relationship. Uncertainty on
this issue exacerbates the unpredictable legal framework for
determining employee status. In order for the thresholdremuneration test to deliver its potential benefits of logic and
simplicity, courts must clarify the meaning of “remuneration.”
2. The Test Generates Inconsistency Between the FLSA and
Other Employment Statutes
Another problem with the threshold-remuneration test is
its potential for inconsistency with the FLSA, the employment
211
statute that itself regulates employee compensation. Judge
Randolph recognized this difficulty in his dissenting opinion in
212
Seattle Opera. Judge Randolph asserted that, based on the
majority’s finding of the choristers to be employees, the Opera’s
207. Rafi v. Thompson, No. 02-2356, 2006 WL 3091483, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct.
30, 2006); see also Holder v. Town of Bristol, No. 3:09–CV–32 PPS, 2009 WL
3004552, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 17, 2009) (“[N]on-financial benefits could establish an employment relationship in the right context.”); Neff v. Civil Air Patrol, 916 F. Supp. 710, 714 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (noting that education may constitute compensation).
208. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMP’T COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2
(2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-III-A-1-c; Title VII:
Vaccination Policies, Covered Entities, Religious Accommodation, U.S. EQUAL
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
foia/letters/2012/religious_accommodation_and_vaccination.html.
209. Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir.
2013).
210. Neff, 916 F. Supp. at 713. But see Kpere-Daibo, supra note 21, at 150–
51 (arguing that the motive to give back to society is “praiseworthy and should
be promoted by society and its laws”).
211. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).
212. Seattle Opera v. N.L.R.B., 292 F.3d 757, 777 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Randolph, J., dissenting).

BODTKE_4fmt

1144

1/6/2015 3:00 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:1113
213

clear understanding of the choristers as volunteers amounted
to nothing more than a “charade” that theoretically put the
214
Opera in violation of the FLSA and federal tax laws. As
Judge Randolph noted, however, whether the choristers would
find protection under the FLSA is highly questionable. The Department of Labor regulations specifically acknowledge that reimbursement for “approximate out-of-pocket expenses,” like
that in Seattle Opera, does not cause a volunteer to become an
215
employee. Because this regulation technically applies only to
216
volunteers at public agencies, it might not cover the auxiliary
choristers of a not-for-profit company like the Opera. Even so,
Judge Randolph argued that Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.
would, on its own, likely prevent the auxiliary choristers from
217
establishing employment status under the FLSA. According
to Judge Randolph, the auxiliary choristers resembled the railroad trainees in Walling since they too were not being compensated for the work performed and had no expectation of com218
pensation. The majority, however, dismissed this reliance on
Walling because Walling was interpreting the FLSA rather
219
than the NLRA (the statute at issue in Seattle Opera). This
application of Walling suggests that divergent conclusions regarding employee status could result under different employment statutes. Such an application, however, perpetrates the
220
problem of inconsistency across employment statutes.
221
This problem plays out even more clearly in Pietras.
Pietras was a volunteer firefighter for the Farmingville Fire
222
The Second Circuit held that
District, a public agency.
Pietras’ receipt of certain benefits gave rise to an employment
223
relationship under Title VII. Those same benefits, however,
would not have made Pietras an employee under the FLSA.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(b) (2012). The Opera claimed that the $214 represented reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs associated with transportation
and parking. Seattle Opera, 292 F.3d at 762–63.
216. 29 C.F.R. § 553.101(a).
217. Seattle Opera, 292 F.3d at 774.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 762 & n.4.
220. See DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 20.
221. Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 468
(2d Cir. 1999).
222. Id. at 470–71.
223. Id. at 473.
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The FLSA regulations explicitly provide that “individuals do
not lose their volunteer status if they are provided reasonable
benefits by a public agency for whom they perform volunteer
224
services.” The regulations go on to list benefits that would be
considered reasonable, including health insurance, life insurance, disability insurance, workers’ compensation, and pension
225
plans. Under this standard, Pietras’ receipt of a retirement
pension, life insurance, death benefits, disability insurance,
226
and some medical benefits would almost certainly not entitle
her to protection under the FLSA. Yet this same combination of
benefits constituted sufficient remuneration under the thresh227
old-remuneration test. Therefore, while Pietras is an employee under Title VII, she likely would not be under the FLSA.
Such a disconnect between employment statutes undercuts the
threshold-remuneration test’s simplicity and perpetuates the
potential for inconsistent results in determining employment
228
status across employment statutes. In order to preserve its
potential for clarifying employee status in volunteer contexts,
the threshold-remuneration test should incorporate consistency
with the FLSA.
The threshold-remuneration test offers several benefits
lacking in traditional multi-factor tests. Its focus on compensation rather than control better addresses the core distinction
between employees and volunteers. Its establishment of an antecedent requirement eliminates some of the uncertainty inherent in multi-factor analyses. The threshold-remuneration
approach’s problems, however, may undermine its advantages.
The test’s failure to define remuneration consistently and to accord with the FLSA generates additional unpredictability and
discrepancy in determining who is and is not an employee.
III. COURTS SHOULD MODIFY THE THRESHOLDREMUNERATION TEST TO DEFINE REMUNERATION
AND CORRESPOND WITH THE FLSA
To effectuate the threshold-remuneration test’s benefits,
courts applying the test should articulate a clearer definition of
remuneration that also corresponds to the FLSA. Section A out224. 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(d) (2012).
225. Id.
226. Pietras, 180 F.3d at 471.
227. Id. at 473.
228. See DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 20; Rubinstein, supra note 17, at
628 & nn.120–21.
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lines how FLSA triggers for compensation and definitions of
“significant” compensation would operate to distinguish between employees and volunteers if incorporated into the
threshold-remuneration test. Section B explains why applying
FLSA standards to cases arising under Title VII and other antidiscrimination employment statutes is appropriate and logical.
Section C addresses anticipated counter-arguments to the proposed solution. This Part concludes that the FLSA’s threetiered regulatory framework for determining the employment
status of volunteers and unpaid interns offers a clear and logical method for courts to judge whether a volunteer is (or legally
should be) receiving significant remuneration under the
threshold-remuneration test.
A. MECHANICS: HOW COURTS SHOULD APPLY FLSA STANDARDS
TO THE THRESHOLD-REMUNERATION TEST
The Department of Labor has articulated definite standards for determining the FLSA employment status of volun229
teers for public agencies in the Code of Federal Regulations
and of unpaid interns in the Wage and Hour Division’s Fact
230
Sheet. Although the standards for volunteers at not-for-profit
private entities are less precise, the Supreme Court decisions in
231
232
Walling and Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation, in combina233
tion with the Department of Labor’s guidelines, provide the
necessary framework for evaluating what constitutes compensation for volunteers at not-for-profit companies.
Courts applying the threshold-remuneration test to volunteers at public agencies should hold in accordance with the
FLSA regulations that individuals who perform service for “civic, charitable, or humanitarian reasons, without promise, ex234
pectation or receipt of compensation for services rendered”
“may be paid expenses, reasonable benefits, a nominal fee, or
any combination thereof, for their service without losing their

229. 29 C.F.R. §§ 553.100–.106.
230. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 95. Several courts apply these standards
when determining the employment status of unpaid interns. See Glatt v. Fox
Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6784 (WHP), 2013 WL 2495140, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2013) for a recent and highly publicized application of the
standards.
231. Walling v. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. 148 (1947).
232. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
233. FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 93.
234. 29 C.F.R. § 553.101(a).
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235

status as volunteers.” The courts should further rely upon the
FLSA regulations’ delineation of what constitutes permissible
236
reimbursements, reasonable benefits, and nominal fees. The
regulations do not address whether future job opportunities
represent a benefit that creates an employment relationship.
Based on the six criteria for unpaid interns, however, it appears that the potential for a future job should not trigger
FLSA obligations. One of the required criterion for an intern to
maintain unpaid status is that the intern “is not necessarily
entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship,” not that
237
there is no potential whatsoever for a job. Since unpaid interns are viewed with greater scrutiny than traditional volun238
teers, it seems that this allowance for unpaid interns should
apply to volunteers at public agencies as well.
For unpaid workers donating services to for-profit companies, including unpaid interns, courts applying the thresholdremuneration test should analyze whether the unpaid worker
is entitled to compensation under the six-factor test promulgat239
ed by the Department of Labor. In other words, if the employer derives an immediate advantage from the intern’s work
or fails to satisfy one of the other factors, the unpaid intern
should be an employee under both the FLSA and the thresholdremuneration test, even if he or she received no wages or indirect benefits. This interpretation allows an intern to gain protection under Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes
as long as they are entitled to compensation under the FLSA.
Because the employee would have been receiving wages had
the employer complied with the law, the employee should be
able to satisfy the requirement of significant remuneration. The
requirement that the intern is “not necessarily entitled to a job
at the conclusion of the internship” also makes clear that the
mere possibility of a future job will not create an employment
240
relationship.
For volunteers at not-for-profit companies, courts adopting
the threshold-remuneration test should follow precedent in

235. Id. § 553.106(a).
236. Id. § 553.106(b)–(f); supra notes 90 and 91 and accompanying text.
237. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 95.
238. See Fair Labor Standards Act Advisor: Volunteers, supra note 66 (discussing the different standards for volunteers at public agencies versus notfor-profit enterprises and for-profit companies).
239. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 95.
240. See id.
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Walling and Alamo in determining when benefits constitute
significant remuneration. The Walling Court ruled that the
FLSA is not meant to cover “each person who, without promise
or expectation of compensation, but solely for his personal purpose or pleasure, worked in activities carried on by other per241
sons . . . .” The Walling decision further clarified that the potential for a future job alone will not establish an employment
relationship, since the railroad trainees had clear potential for
a job at the conclusion of the training but were not held to be
242
employees. Finally, the Alamo ruling suggested that only
compensation creating economic dependence would create employee status for volunteer work done in a nonprofit’s commer243
cial enterprise. Because this precedent still contains some
244
gaps, courts should consult the FLSA regulations for volunteers at public agencies in determining what constitutes permissible reimbursed expenses and nominal fees. Since the Department of Labor premised these regulations on Congress’s
intention not “to discourage or impede volunteer activities for
245
civic, charitable, or humanitarian purposes,” using the public
agency volunteer regulations in a not-for-profit context should
be permissible since it upholds Congressional purpose to avoid
discouraging traditional volunteerism.
B. TRANSFERRING FLSA DEFINITIONS OF REMUNERATION TO
THE THRESHOLD-REMUNERATION TEST IS APPROPRIATE AND
LOGICAL
Precedent exists for transferring standards developed under one employment statute to another. For example, in Smith
v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court found that because Title
VII provided for a disparate impact claim, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) should as well since its lan246
guage and purpose closely resemble Title VII’s. Courts have
also looked to the NLRA, the “grandparent of most labor

241. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947).
242. Id. at 150.
243. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301
(1985).
244. For example, neither these cases nor the regulatory guidance explicitly address the status of reimbursed expenses or stipends for volunteers in
nonprofit enterprises, both of which are relatively common. See ELLIS &
NOYES, supra note 57, at 3.
245. 29 C.F.R. § 553.101(b) (2012).
246. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 235–40 (2005).
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laws,” for guidance in interpreting other employment laws.
Courts interpreting the NLRA, in turn, have considered the
FLSA in determining individuals’ employee status. In WBAI
Pacifica Foundation, the NLRB determined that volunteers’ eligibility for reimbursed travel expenses and childcare allowances did not demonstrate sufficient compensation to establish an
employment relationship, noting that such evidence would fail
249
to trigger FLSA obligations. These examples demonstrate
that courts interpreting a particular employment law consult
other employment statutes and sometimes borrow the standards developed under those statutes. Applying the FLSA definitions and triggers for compensation to anti-discrimination employment statutes would not diverge from precedent.
The application of the FLSA standards to the thresholdremuneration test is particularly apt. A central purpose of the
250
FLSA is to enforce a minimum wage. In effect, the FLSA enforces the very concept that the threshold-remuneration test
251
requires plaintiffs to show: compensation. This link between
the FLSA and remuneration makes the FLSA’s standards for
when benefits establish an employment relationship persuasive. Moreover, the applicability and enforcement of the FLSA
dictates to some degree the outcome of the first step in the
252
threshold-remuneration test. For example, if a student intern
meets the six criteria of the trainee test, that intern is not entitled to compensation and therefore does not receive sufficient
remuneration to be a protected employee under antidiscrimination statutes. On the other hand, if an intern’s activ247. Mitchell Rubinstein, The Use of Predischarge Misconduct Discovered
After an Employees’ Termination As a Defense in Employment Litigation, 24
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1990).
248. Mitchell Rubinstein, Advisory Labor Arbitration Under New York
Law: Does It Have a Place in Employment Law?, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 419,
437 (2005); see, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975)
(interpreting Title VII’s back pay provision based on the NLRA’s similar provision); Mitchell Rubinstein, The Affirmative Action Controversy, 3 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 111, 114 & n. 26 (1985) (noting that the term “affirmative action” as
used in Title VII cases originated in the Wagner Act).
249. WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 179, 1273 & n.3 (1999).
250. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).
251. See Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir.
1990) (“Compensation . . . is an essential condition to the existence of an employer-employee relationship.”).
252. See Yamada, supra note 21, at 244 (“[I]f more student interns were
paid in compliance with the FLSA, the issue of whether the lack of compensation precludes the plaintiff from claiming employee status in a discrimination
claim would become moot in many instances.”).

BODTKE_4fmt

1150

1/6/2015 3:00 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:1113

ities deliver an “immediate advantage” to the employer, that
253
intern is entitled to a minimum wage and will be able to
demonstrate significant compensation under the threshold254
remuneration test. This fundamental connection between the
FLSA and the concept of remuneration makes the application
of FLSA standards to the threshold-remuneration test functional and logical.
An additional benefit of the proposed solution is that it
does not require enhanced enforcement of the FLSA itself.
Stronger enforcement of the FLSA likely would increase the
number of volunteers and interns receiving a minimum wage
and thereby broaden the range of volunteers able to establish
255
significant remuneration. The Department of Labor, however,
has only sparingly enforced the FLSA against illegal unpaid internships, effectively forcing volunteers to sue under the FLSA
256
as a preliminary to a successful Title VII suit. But under the
proposed solution, volunteers need not sue under the FLSA and
procure a minimum wage before bringing a Title VII or other
anti-discrimination suit. Instead, volunteers can show employee status under the modified threshold-remuneration test by
showing that they are employees entitled to a minimum wage
under the FLSA. Thus, the proposed solution bypasses the need
for stronger FLSA enforcement to give those legally entitled to
compensation the protections of anti-discrimination employment statutes.
Using the FLSA standards will substantially improve the
threshold-remuneration test’s ability to clarify the employment
relationship. By adopting the FLSA’s explicit definitions of
what entitles a worker to compensation and what constitutes
significant compensation, the threshold-remuneration test can
257
escape the fate of indeterminate, confusing multi-factor tests.
A modified threshold-remuneration test with more rigorous definitions of remuneration will relieve some of the existing test’s
258
uncertainty. Moreover, using the FLSA standards will pre253. See Ortner, supra note 60, at 2620.
254. See Yamada, supra note 21, at 244.
255. See id.
256. See Andrew Mark Bennett, Unpaid Internships and the Department of
Labor: The Impact of Underenforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act on
Equal Opportunity, 11 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 292,
307–08 (2011).
257. See Carlson, supra note 9, at 298–99.
258. See Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 157 (noting that it “is not an easy
task” to draw the line between employees and volunteers because “each case is
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vent absurd situations where an individual is an employee un259
der Title VII but not under the FLSA. Applying the threshold-remuneration test with reference to the FLSA’s definitions
and triggers for compensation will clarify employee status and
simplify an increasingly muddled area of law.
C. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS TO A THRESHOLD-REMUNERATION
TEST MODIFIED BY FLSA STANDARDS
This section acknowledges four expected counterarguments. First, the underlying FLSA rules contain their own
interpretative challenges and deficiencies. Second, bright-line
rules like the threshold-remuneration test allow employers to
manipulate the employment relationship. Third, courts should
recognize job experience and future job opportunities as substantial compensation. Fourth, the differing goals of the FLSA
and anti-discrimination statutes support two different standards of coverage. This section addresses each of these arguments in turn and explains why they do not extinguish the proposed solution’s benefits of clarity, consistency, and
predictability.
1. The Underlying FLSA Framework Contains Its Own
Problems
One expected objection to the proposed solution is that the
FLSA’s standards for distinguishing between employees and
volunteers pose their own interpretive problems. Some scholars
argue that the Department of Labor’s six-prong test for determining the legality of unpaid internships contains significant
260
flaws, including differing applications by federal courts, an
261
unrealistic line between training and work, uncertainty as to
how the test should apply to internships sponsored by colleg262
es, and a failure to acknowledge the long-term benefits em263
ployers derive from unpaid interns. Others argue that the sixprong test places a chilling effect on beneficial unpaid intern264
ships that help students develop job skills. Some scholars
fact specific”); supra Part II.C.1.
259. See DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 20; supra Part II.B.2.
260. Yamada, supra note 99.
261. Yamada, supra note 21, at 233.
262. Durrant, supra 145, at 177–78; Yamada, supra note 21, at 233–34.
263. Durrant, supra note 145, at 178–79.
264. Sarah Braun, Comment, The Obama Crackdown: Another Failed Attempt To Regulate the Exploitation of Unpaid Internships, 41 SW. L. REV. 281,
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contend the FLSA harms nonprofit enterprises that rely on
volunteer work not necessarily within courts’ conceptions of
265
“ordinary volunteerism.” In contrast, other scholars question
whether the FLSA framework provides sufficient protection to
266
unpaid volunteers in the government and nonprofit sectors.
No legal framework is perfect, and the FLSA framework
for determining when a volunteer becomes an employee is no
exception. The FLSA standards, however, provide a more defined and workable structure than the present unsettled concept of “threshold-remuneration” applied to Title VII, the
ADEA, and other statutory anti-discrimination claims. Whereas courts’ current conceptions of compensation under the
threshold-remuneration test range from substantial monetary
267
payment to more amorphous benefits like job opportunities,
the FLSA framework delineates specific categories of remuner268
ation that give rise to an employment relationship and crite269
ria an internship must meet not to create employment. These
guidelines can reduce divergent concepts of remuneration that
lead to inconsistent results. Moreover, by linking the FLSA
framework to the threshold-remuneration test, legislators can
address any detriments in the distinction between volunteers
and employees simultaneously across the FLSA and antidiscrimination statutes like Title VII. In other words, reforms
to the FLSA standards will concurrently improve the test to determine employee status under anti-discrimination statutes.
2. Bright-Line Rules Allow Employers to Manipulate the
Employment Relationship
Another concern with a more defined thresholdremuneration test is that it gives employers the power to decide
270
unilaterally whether a volunteer becomes an employee. An
employer may avoid liability under the FLSA and anti294–300 (2012); Lauren Frederickson, Comment, Falling Through the Cracks
of Title VII: The Plight of the Unpaid Intern, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 245, 269
(2013).
265. Dunn, supra note 64, at 464.
266. See Anthony J. Tucci, Worthy Exemption? Examining How the DOL
Should Apply the FLSA to Unpaid Interns at Non-Profits and Public Agencies,
97 IOWA L. REV. 1363, 1385 (2012).
267. See supra Part II.C.1.
268. See 29 C.F.R. § 553.106 (2012).
269. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 95.
270. I thank Professor Stephen Befort for pointing out this counterargument.
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discrimination statutes by simply not providing its volunteers
271
with any benefits (or with only certain nominal benefits).
Meanwhile volunteers lack the bargaining power to negotiate
for greater benefits that might give rise to an employment relationship and its attendant statutory protections.
This criticism overestimates employers’ ability to manipulate the employment relationship under the proposed framework. If courts tie the threshold-remuneration test to the FLSA
standards, for-profit employers cannot evade liability under either the FLSA or anti-discrimination statutes simply by withholding significant benefits from their interns. Because the Department of Labor requires interns be paid whenever their
work provides an “immediate advantage” to the employer,
merely not paying the intern will not avoid employment sta272
tus. Moreover, the requirement that employers receive no
immediate advantage from the internship is difficult to fulfill—
especially if the employer’s ulterior motive for the internship is
273
free labor.
Manipulation of the employment relationship against volunteers in government agencies and nonprofit enterprises is also less likely than it may appear under a FLSA-informed
threshold-remuneration test. Although the FLSA regulations
identify specific types of compensation that will not transform
public agency volunteers into employees, the regulations also
provide an important caveat: “whether the furnishing of expenses, benefits, or fees would result in individuals’ losing their
status as volunteers . . . can only be determined by examining
the total amount of payments made . . . in the context of the
274
economic realities of the particular situation.” Thus, the proposed solution still retains some flexibility in determining the
employment relationship that cuts against employer manipulation. Similarly, the FLSA standards for determining when nonprofit volunteers become employees contain the concept of eco275
nomic dependence. This standard, while more definite than
present understanding of “remuneration,” is not a bright-line
rule. Although my solution recommends that courts apply the
271. See Flanagan, supra note 158 (“The key[] for employers to avoid turning interns into employees . . . [is] . . . no or insignificant remuneration . . . .”).
272. See FACT SHEET #71, supra note 95.
273. See Tuschman, supra note 97.
274. 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(f) (2012).
275. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301
(finding that the volunteers were actually employees because the amount of
benefits they received made them “entirely dependent upon the Foundation”).
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public agency standards for stipends and nominal fees to nonprofit enterprises, the case law’s overall economic dependence
276
standard still applies. As a result, employer manipulation
under a FLSA-informed threshold-remuneration may be less
likely than critics suppose.
That being said, ultimately the employer decides how to
structure an internship and what benefits to provide volunteers
in the course of their service. Accordingly, employers can drastically reduce the likelihood of creating an employment relationship by adhering to the legal requirements. This scenario,
however, is not necessarily detrimental. For one, it reflects a
legal system with discernable standards and predictable results, rather than unclear rules and arbitrary decisions. This
clarity allows both employers and employees to predict the legal consequences of their actions or situations, and also avoids
277
divergent treatment of similarly situated individuals. Moreover, the very fact that volunteers do not receive monetary compensation gives them greater bargaining power than the typical
employee because they can deprive the institution of their
278
freely volunteered labor. Nonprofit and government agencies
depend on volunteers and do not have the luxury of creating an
279
environment where people do not want to volunteer. Thus,
although agencies can prevent their volunteers from becoming
employees, they cannot consequently abuse those volunteers
with impunity; volunteers can check an agency’s actions by
threatening to leave. This check on the institution benefiting
from volunteer labor, although it does not eliminate the institution’s ability to structure the volunteer relationship, makes
that ability less worrisome.
3. Job Experience and Employment Opportunities Should Be
Included in the Remunerative Concept
As several scholars point out, however, student interns do
not have the same freedom as traditional volunteers to exit a
hostile work environment because they need the job experience
276. Supra Part III.A.
277. See generally Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV.
367, 368–69 (1988) (explaining the need for certainty and equality in the law).
278. See Eide, supra note 154.
279. Cf. Linda S. Hartenian, Nonprofit Agency Dependence on Direct Service and Indirect Support Volunteers: An Empirical Investigation, 17 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 319, 332 (2007) (noting that agencies do not have
the luxury of turning away volunteers, even when their performance is subpar).
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and employment opportunities an internship affords to advance
280
economically. But in this Note’s proposed solution, job experience and the potential for employment do not constitute signifi281
cant remuneration. Arguably this failure to recognize job experience and opportunities as sufficient compensation to create
an employment relationship ignores the student intern’s economic compulsion to endure a discriminatory workplace.
This criticism misconstrues the meaning of employment.
The argument rests on the premise that economic reliance
alone gives rise to an employment relationship. Employment,
however, dictates more than economic reliance; it requires an
282
economic exchange. If an intern is not providing anything of
value to the company or agency in return for job experience,
any benefits the intern receives are gratuitous rather than
compensatory. The FLSA six-part test recognizes this key distinction by protecting interns whose economic reliance arises
283
from a true economic exchange of labor for benefits. The point
is not that unpaid interns who do not provide the company a financial advantage deserve discrimination and harassment; the
point is that unpaid interns who do not provide the company an
advantage are not employees. Since the protections of the
FLSA, Title VII, and other statutes rely upon a finding of employment, those interns do not fall within the Acts’ coverage.
Therefore, the appropriate remedy to afford interns and volunteers protection under Title VII is a legislative amendment rather than illogical judicial maneuvering that reaches the desired result.
4. The Goals of the FLSA and Title VII Support Different and
Separate Standards of Coverage
The most substantive objection to providing a single standard for determining volunteers’ employment status under the
FLSA and anti-discrimination statutes like Title VII is the differing consequences to volunteers from exclusion from FLSA’s
protections versus exclusion from anti-discrimination statutes’
protections. Most people accept that volunteers do not deserve
a right to minimum wage because the essence of volunteering is

280. Kpere-Daibo, supra note 21, at 148–50.
281. See supra Part III.A.
282. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 138, at 322.
283. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 95 (finding employment where the intern’s activities provide an “immediate advantage” to the employer).
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284

to work willingly without pay. On the other hand, it seems
unjust for those same volunteers to suffer discrimination and
harassment without a legal remedy simply because they are
285
not paid. As a result, two separate standards, one to determine employment status under the FLSA, and one to determine employment status under anti-discrimination statutes,
might better fulfill the statutes’ goals and promote volunteer286
ism, even though it would deprive employment law of a uniform definition of “employee.”
While this argument expresses a reasonable policy and
moral judgment, what it does not express is Congress’s judgment. Congress explicitly made the FLSA’s, Title VII’s, the
ADEA’s, and other statutes’ coverage contingent on employee
status. As long as Congress continues to use employee status as
the “clearly stated basis” for statutory protections, courts are
287
constrained by that measure of coverage. The O’Connor court
made this point blatantly, concluding that “it is for Congress . . . and not this court, to provide a remedy . . . for plain288
tiffs in O’Connor’s position.” The Juino court too reiterated its
constrained role, shifting the responsibility to Congress to es289
tablish a basis for coverage other than employment. But
while employment remains the legislatively dictated basis for
coverage, courts should interpret that basis consistently across
all statutes that invoke it. Only such consistency can create a
284. See Dunn, supra note 64, at 469 (arguing that whether a volunteer
worker is seeking compensation should play a role in whether the FLSA is
triggered); supra notes 56 and 57 and accompanying text.
285. See Dunn, supra note 64, at 471 (arguing that volunteers should be
exempted from the FLSA but should be included under Title VII and the
ADEA).
286. Id. at 472. I also thank Professor Stephen Befort for pointing out this
counter-argument.
287. See Carlson, supra note 9, at 300 (“The courts, of course, cannot abandon employee status as a test as long as Congress and state legislatures continue to make employee status the clearly stated basis of statutory coverage.”).
288. O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1997). Two state legislatures, Oregon and New York, have provided such a remedy for student interns
in their states, although not for the traditional volunteer. See Mark S. Goldstein, New York State Becomes the Fourth Jurisdiction To Protect Unpaid Interns from Employment Discrimination, FORBES (July 28, 2014), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/theemploymentbeat/2014/07/28/new-york-state-becomes-thefourth-jurisdiction-to-protect-unpaid-interns-from-employment-discrimination;
Howard Rubin & Don Stait, Oregon Passes Workplace Protection Law for Unpaid Interns, LITTLER (June 21, 2013), http://www.littler.com/publication
-press/publication/oregon-passes-workplace-protection-law-unpaid-interns.
289. Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir.
2013).
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coherent body of law that fosters predictability and fairness.
Unless Congress provides clearer direction to define employment differently under different statutes, courts should pursue
a consistent definition or else face accountability for an increasingly confused regulatory system.
One way courts can take a step in the right direction is to
incorporate FLSA definitions of “significant compensation” and
triggers for compensation into the threshold-remuneration test.
This approach would capitalize on the threshold-remuneration
test’s logic and efficiency while improving its consistency across
courts and its continuity with the federal statute that regulates
remuneration. While this approach will clarify the employment
question only in volunteer contexts, it provides much-needed
refinement to the “employee” concept.
CONCLUSION
Courts increasingly confront situations where volunteers
and unpaid interns claim employment status under Title VII
and other anti-discrimination employment statutes. Faced with
this novel situation, courts have adopted two different approaches: (1) the common law agency test that analyzes compensation as one of several non-dispositive factors, or, alternatively, (2) the threshold-remuneration test that requires a
preliminary showing of sufficient compensation before engaging
in a common law analysis. This circuit split represents just part
of a growing non-uniformity in the definition of “employee”
across statutes, legal tests, and jurisdictions, and demonstrates
an increasing unpredictability in determining whether an individual is an employee. The threshold-remuneration test offers a
potential solution to this muddled legal landscape in volunteer
contexts by refocusing on the fundamental definition of employment and reducing indeterminate multi-factor analyses.
With all its benefits, however, the threshold-remuneration test
fails to define remuneration clearly and to correspond to the
employment statute that actually enforces remuneration: the
FLSA. These weaknesses threaten to dilute the test’s potential
clarity and efficiency.
Courts applying the threshold-remuneration should incorporate the FLSA standards for when compensation is required
and when compensation creates an employment relationship
into the concept of “significant remuneration.” This approach
will preserve the threshold-remuneration test’s ability to clarify
the employment relationship in volunteer contexts and will
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avoid creating situations where an individual is an employee
under one statute but not another. A modified thresholdremuneration test can represent a small step towards muchneeded clarity and consistency in employment law’s definition
of “employee.”

